asn.dev

Routing security

AS12792 CINET-AS Komsomolska str. 43

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 6 of 6 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 11 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

6 observed

Every prefix observed with AS12792 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0f:9400:6170::/44RPKI validIRR31
2a09:40c0::/29RPKI validIRR31
2a09:98c0::/29RPKI validIRR31
2a09:4040::/29RPKI validIRR31
2a09:9740::/29RPKI validIRR31
2602:fed2:7910::/44RPKI validIRR31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

11 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS12792 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2602:fed2:7910::/44/44ARIN
2a09:4040::/29/48RIPENCC
2a09:40c0::/29/48RIPENCC
2a09:9740::/29/48RIPENCC
2a09:98c0::/29/48RIPENCC
2a0a:e140::/29/29RIPENCC
2a0b:487::/32/32RIPENCC
2a0f:9400:6170::/44/44RIPENCC
2a10:eb85::/32/32RIPENCC
2a10:eb86::/32/32RIPENCC
2a12:300::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

11 objects · 5 not announced

Route objects naming AS12792 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a0a:e140::/29RIPEreproxy.networkMEREZHA-MNT2025-12-26Not announced
2a0b:487::/32RIPEreproxy.networkUA-MEREZHA-1-MNT2026-04-21Not announced
2a10:eb85::/32RIPEreproxy.networkMEREZHA-MNT2026-04-21Not announced
2a10:eb86::/32RIPEreproxy.networkMEREZHA-MNT2026-04-21Not announced
2a12:300::/29RIPEreproxy.networkUA-MEREZHA-1-MNT2025-12-26Not announced
2602:fed2:7910::/44ARINFree Range Cloud Customer SubnetMNT-FRCH-12026-06-04Announced
2a09:4040::/29RIPE—LVNET-MNT2026-04-21Announced
2a09:40c0::/29RIPE—LVNET-MNT2026-04-21Announced
2a09:9740::/29RIPE—LVNET-MNT2026-04-21Announced
2a09:98c0::/29RIPE—LVNET-MNT2026-04-21Announced
2a0f:9400:6170::/44RIPE—FRC2-MNT2026-06-04Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS12792 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BTN-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS12792 as a direct member
AS-CINETRIPELists AS12792 as a direct member
AS-CINET-UAIXRIPELists AS12792 as a direct member
AS-NETASSISTRIPELists AS12792 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS12792 as a direct member
AS-UKRAINERIPELists AS12792 as a direct member
AS-UKRTELRTRIPELists AS12792 as a direct member
AS-ULTRA_NETRIPELists AS12792 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-31 20:05 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-31. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.