asn.dev

Routing security

AS12785 SI-ZVD

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 1 of 1 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 1 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

1 observed

Every prefix observed with AS12785 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
91.223.230.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

1 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS12785 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
91.223.230.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS12785 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
212.84.96.0/19RADBPNAP-NYCMAINT-AS18282023-11-13Not announced
91.223.230.0/24RIPEZVD Zavod za varstvo pri delu d.d.MNT-T-22011-09-28Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS12785 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-T2-CUSTRIPELists AS12785 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-18 12:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-18. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.