asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12777 OTHER Eser Telekom Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 2.30K 2 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly TR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Eser Telekom / Yeditepe University

Turkey · AI-generated

education telecom business

The AS handle is the word OTHER, and the address space belongs to a university.

What it's used for

  • A Turkish network carrying university address space. 2,304 addresses in two IPv4 prefixes, one observed BGP neighbour, and no IPv6 announced.

Notable

  • The AS handle is OTHER; the registered holder is Eser Telekom Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.
  • 195.49.216.0/21 is registered as YEDITEPE-NET-TR to Yeditepe University.
  • 193.255.44.0/24 carries the netname YU-NET.
  • First observed in the routing archive in April 2001.
  • Six sampled addresses were queried and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • OTHER is what a form says when nobody filled it in. Somewhere in the process of registering this autonomous system, a category field with an "other" option ended up in the name field, and it has been the network's public label ever since. Routing tools, looking-glass pages and whois clients all print it, because none of them have anything better to print.
  • Both blocks are registered to a university while a telecommunications company holds the AS. That is the ordinary arrangement where a campus buys connectivity and its provider announces the space: the addresses stay with the institution, the routing belongs to the carrier.
  • One neighbour means a single path to the rest of the internet. For a university network that is a real constraint — everything the campus reaches depends on one adjacent operator, and the AS number exists mainly so the address space has an origin of its own.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS8517National Academic Network and Information Center126

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-04, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 2 prefixes · 2.30K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
TRTurkey2

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS12777
Registry name
OTHER
Registrant
ESER-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@esertelekom.com
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2018-09-04
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
50% valid · 1 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
1 authorising AS12777
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
5 naming AS12777

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 452 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-05. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check