asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12739 NETLINE_AS

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 9.98K 7 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 8 2 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

NetLine

Russia · AI-generated

isp business

Seven blocks, four filings, twelve years, and one IPv6 /32 covering all of it.

What it's used for

  • Internet access in Russia. 9,984 addresses in seven IPv4 prefixes, one IPv6 prefix, and eleven observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Dated netnames record three filings: RU-NETLINE-20020702, RU-NETLINE-20040618 and RU-NETLINE-20140725 on two blocks.
  • Three further blocks carry a bare NETLINE with no date or country prefix.
  • The single IPv6 announcement is 2a01:7440::/32.
  • Eighteen sampled addresses were queried and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • The two netname styles sit side by side in one holder's records: the structured country-plus-date form on some blocks and a bare label on others. Both were valid, the registry never required either, and which one appears depends on who filled in the form.
  • Four allocations across twelve years, each a /20 or smaller, is what growth looked like after the era of generous assignments ended. The blocks cannot be aggregated because they come from unrelated ranges, so a network of ten thousand addresses occupies seven entries in every routing table on the Internet.
  • One /32 of IPv6 covers 65,536 subnets and needs no successor. The contrast with the IPv4 side of the same network is the whole argument for the newer protocol, stated in two lines of the same record.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
MSK-IX MoscowMoscow, Russia195.208.211.22

Transit providers

8 upstream, 2 downstream and 16 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS20764CJSC RASCOM206
AS1299Arelion Sweden AB63
AS28917Fiord Networks, UAB32
AS29076Citytelecom LLC23
AS9049JSC "ER-Telecom Holding"7
AS24482SG.GS6
AS49673Truenetwork LLC5
AS50384iHome LLC5

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 7 prefixes · 9.98K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation8

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS12739
Registry name
NetLine_AS
Registrant
NTLR
Abuse contact
abuse@ntl.ru
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2021-09-29
Allocation
allocated

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
Netline Russia
Scope
Regional
Traffic ratio
Balanced
Peering policy
Open
IRR as-set
RIPE::AS-NETLINE
Website
http://www.netline.ru

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 6 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS12739
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 6 of 6 announcements
Route objects
7 naming AS12739

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check