asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12722 RECONN

Hosting RIPE

IPv4 addresses 22.02K 37 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 4 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 18 36 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

RECONN

Russia · AI-generated

isp transit hosting

European addresses registered to Seychelles and Hong Kong companies, announced from Moscow.

What it's used for

  • Access, hosting and transit in Russia. 21,760 addresses in 37 IPv4 prefixes, four IPv6 prefixes, and 93 observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The operator's own blocks are RU-RCN-19960719, dated July 1996, and RU-RCN-20090723.
  • Three prefixes carry SC-NET-20181101, SC-NET-20181106 and SC-NET-20190515, registered to iNet Ltd.
  • Three more carry HK-NEXT-20181115, registered to Next Limited.
  • One is RU-DOMAINSRU, registered to DOMENY.RU LLC.
  • The IPv6 announcements include a /29, 2a05:4800::/29, and a /48 from 2001:67c.

Interesting

  • SC and HK are country codes for the Seychelles and Hong Kong, attached to European address space announced from Russia. That combination is the visible end of the market in IPv4: when a registry stopped issuing new blocks, addresses became an asset that could be bought, leased and held through whichever corporate structure suited, and the netname records where the paperwork went rather than where the packets go.
  • All six of those blocks were registered within seven months of each other. A cluster like that is one transaction, or one arrangement, split across several records.
  • A /29 of IPv6 is eight times the standard allocation, which a registry issues when an operator documents a need for it. Holding that much v6 alongside 21,760 v4 addresses is the inversion the protocol was designed to produce, and it is still unusual enough to notice.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

18 upstream, 36 downstream and 62 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS35598INETCOM CARRIER LLC847
AS31500Global Network Management Inc225
AS1299Arelion Sweden AB155
AS29076Citytelecom LLC119
AS62255BiMajLink d.o.o.74
AS20764CJSC RASCOM59
AS59692IQWeb FZ-LLC56
AS24482SG.GS25

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 37 prefixes · 22.02K addresses IPv6 4 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation41

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS12722
Registry name
RECONN
Registrant
RECONN LLC
Abuse contact
abuse@reconn.ru
Registered
2011-02-14
Last changed
2024-06-26
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
19% valid · 6 valid, 24 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
ROAs
68 authorising AS12722
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
97% registered · 30 of 31 announcements
Route objects
104 naming AS12722

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check