Autonomous system
AS12660 SHARIF-EDU-NET Sharif University Of Technology
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Sharif University of Technology
education isp
Six announcements sharing one netname and one allocation date, tiling a single /19 exactly.
What it's used for
- Academic and regional connectivity in Tehran. 18,432 addresses in nine IPv4 prefixes, two observed BGP neighbours, and no IPv6 announced.
Notable
- Six blocks all carry the netname
IR-SHARIF-20020603:81.31.160.0/20,81.31.176.0/21,81.31.184.0/23,81.31.186.0/24,81.31.187.0/24and81.31.188.0/22. - Together those six cover
81.31.160.0/19exactly. - The remaining blocks are
IR-SHARIF-20030404,IR-SHARIF-20190123, and one registered under the nameDadehaye-Donyaye-Door. - Eighteen sampled addresses were queried and none returned a name.
Interesting
- Deaggregation usually has an innocent explanation: separate allocations, arriving at different times, announced as they were received. These six rule that out. One netname, one date, one contiguous
/19— and six routes where one would do. Whatever split this range happened after the addresses arrived, inside the network, for reasons the registry never recorded. - Every router on the Internet carries all six. A single
/19announcement would be indistinguishable to anyone sending traffic here, which is what makes patterns like this the main driver of routing-table growth. - A university holding eighteen thousand addresses and announcing them for others is the normal shape of early national Internet infrastructure: the first organisation in a country to have a connection ends up carrying everyone who comes next.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-01, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 17 prefixes · 18.43K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| IR | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 17 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS12660- Registry name
- SHARIF-EDU-NET
- Registrant
- Sharif University Of Technology
- Abuse contact
- ripe@sharif.edu
- Registered
- 2002-08-16
- Last changed
- 2025-05-20
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 21% valid · 7 valid, 26 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 9 authorising AS12660
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 33 of 33 announcements
- Route objects
- 21 naming AS12660
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 449 networks and 1,846 prefixes, as published 2026-11-02. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere