Autonomous system
AS12593 AS12593 - LLC "UKRCOM"
Unclassified RIPE Cable/DSL/ISP
Summary
Ukrcom
isp business
Every sampled address in four different blocks answers with the same reverse name, and that name is a sentence.
What it's used for
- Internet access in Ukraine. 12,288 addresses in four IPv4 prefixes, one IPv6 prefix, and 46 observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- All twelve sampled addresses returned a name, and all twelve returned the same one:
unassigned-please-contact-hostmaster.ukrhub.net. - The samples span
212.90.160.0/19,94.125.120.0/21,94.176.196.0/22and185.151.104.0/22— four separate allocations, one answer. - Netnames run
UA-UKRCOM-990720,UA-UKRCOM-20080814,UA-UKRCOM-20080827andUA-UKRCOM-20160510. - The IPv6 announcement is
2a04:42c0::/29. - The AS handle repeats the number it belongs to:
AS12593 - LLC "UKRCOM".
Interesting
- That reverse name is a wildcard record covering the whole zone, and somebody chose to make it useful. Instead of leaving addresses silent or naming them after the machine, the default answer tells anyone who looks that the address is spare and who to write to. Reverse DNS is one of the few channels where a network operator can leave a note for a stranger, and this is one of the few that uses it.
- The wildcard also means the sample proves nothing about which addresses are actually in use. A name that always answers is a name that never distinguishes.
- The reverse zone lives on
ukrhub.netwhile the company is Ukrcom. The infrastructure domain and the trading name are different words, which is common enough that the reverse zone is often the first place a network's real internal name shows up.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Giganet Internet Exchange | Kyiv, Ukraine | 185.1.63.95 |
Transit providers
5 upstream, 12 downstream and 21 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 12.29K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| UA | Ukraine | 5 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS12593- Registry name
- AS12593
- Registrant
- LLC "UKRCOM"
- Abuse contact
- abuse@ukrhub.net
- Registered
- 2002-07-10
- Last changed
- 2026-10-06
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Ukrcom
- Also known as
- Ukrcom
- Network type
- Cable/DSL/ISP
- Scope
- Regional
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
AS-UKRHUB- Present at
- 3 exchanges
- Facilities
- 2 facilities
- Website
- http://www.ukr-com.net
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 5 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 5 authorising AS12593
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 5 of 5 announcements
- Route objects
- 5 naming AS12593
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere