Autonomous system
AS12564 CMBG-AS Bulgarian Government Autonomous System
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Bulgarian Council of Ministers
government enterprise
The Bulgarian government's network, with its public wifi and its transit blocks named separately in the registry.
What it's used for
- Connectivity for the Bulgarian government. 8,448 addresses in nine IPv4 prefixes, four observed BGP neighbours, and no IPv6 announced.
Notable
- Four blocks share the netname
BG-GOVERNMENT-19990722, which spells its 1999 date in full rather than as990722. - A later block is
BG-GOVERNMENT-20161212, and one is simplyCMBG. - Three are named for what they carry:
BGGOV-WIFI-1-NET,BGGOV-TRANSNET-178andBGGOV-TRANSNET-179. - The last two put the third octet of their own address into the name.
- One sampled address answers
host254-162.government.bg.
Interesting
- Naming a block
WIFI-1in a public registry is a small act of documentation aimed at whoever comes next. Anyone reading the record learns which addresses belong to the wireless network without asking, which is useful to an administrator and equally useful to anyone else reading. - The
-1implies aWIFI-2that either exists elsewhere or was expected to. Sequence numbers in netnames are a plan being written down. 19990722is the second block in this range to spell a 1999 date in full, after AS12536. Together they settle the point that the two-digit and four-digit forms were alternatives available at the same time rather than successive conventions.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 9 prefixes · 8.45K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| BG | Bulgaria | 9 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS12564- Registry name
- CMBG-AS
- Registrant
- AS12564-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@government.bg
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2022-01-21
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 9 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 39 authorising AS12564
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 9 of 9 announcements
- Route objects
- 48 naming AS12564
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere