Autonomous system
AS12529 Channels-STC Channels By Saudi Telecom Company (STC) LLC
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Channels by STC
telecom enterprise
A single /23 belonging to a subsidiary of the Saudi national carrier, with a netname written in mixed case.
What it's used for
- Connectivity for a Saudi Telecom subsidiary. 512 addresses in one
/23, one observed BGP neighbour, and no IPv6 announced.
Notable
- The entire inventory is
193.169.190.0/23. - Its netname is
Channels-STC, keeping the capitalisation of the company name rather than the upper case netnames almost always use. - The registrant is Channels By Saudi Telecom Company (STC) LLC, and the AS handle is
CHANNELS-STC. - First seen in routing data in August 2009, a real date rather than the floor of the archive.
Interesting
- A netname in mixed case is a small act of disobedience against a field that has been shouted in since the 1980s. Nothing enforces upper case; it is convention inherited from when these records were read on terminals that had no lower case to offer.
- A subsidiary with its own AS number and one
/23is a company that wanted to be routed independently of its parent. Five hundred addresses do not require that; being separately addressable from the national carrier does, and it is usually a billing or regulatory boundary rather than a technical one. - The 2009 first-seen date makes this one of the few networks here whose age can actually be read from the routing data instead of inferred.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS25019 | Saudi Telecom Company JSC | 118 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-03, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| SA | Saudi Arabia | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS12529- Registry name
- Channels-STC
- Registrant
- lir-sa-channels-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- NOPS@channels.com.sa
- Registered
- 2009-07-29
- Last changed
- 2021-11-03
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 3 authorising AS12529
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 4 naming AS12529
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,851 prefixes, as published 2026-11-04. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere