asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12365 SARKOR-AS Sarkor Telecom - Uztelecom, Upstream

Hosting RIPE

IPv4 addresses 32.00K 24 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 4 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly UZ
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 6 downstream
Flagged prefixes 7 see address space

Summary

Sarkor-Telecom

Uzbekistan · AI-generated

isp eyeball business legacy

An Uzbek internet provider serving residential and business customers.

What it's used for

  • Subscriber access. 32,000 addresses across 24 prefixes, four IPv6 announcements, six observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The netnames publish the internal address plan. Alongside the dated allocations UZ-SARKOR-20031117, 20060203 and 20141124 sit SARKOR-ROUTERS, SARKOR-SERVERS, SARKOR-STATIC-PPPOE-1, -2, and two blocks named Dynamic-customer-PPPoE-pool-1 and -2 in mixed case.
  • The announcements go remarkably small. Below the /18 and the /20 are two /25s, a /26, a /27 and two /28s — sixteen-address blocks announced individually in the global routing table.
  • Reverse DNS splits by customer type: general space answers under sk.uz, business space under b2b.sarkor.uz.
  • The AS handle names its own upstream, "Sarkor Telecom - Uztelecom, Upstream".

Interesting

  • Announcing a /28 is unusual enough that most large networks will not accept it. Filters commonly stop at /24, so those small announcements are visible to direct neighbours and nowhere else — which makes them internal engineering that happens to have leaked into a public dataset.
  • Naming a block SARKOR-ROUTERS in the registry tells anyone reading exactly where the network's own infrastructure lives. It is helpful for the operator's peers and equally helpful to anyone else who reads registries for a living.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 6 downstream and 9 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS28910"Uzbektelekom" Joint Stock Company1,351

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 24 prefixes · 32.00K addresses IPv6 4 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
UZUzbekistan28

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS12365
Registry name
SARKOR-AS
Registrant
JC LLC Sarkor-Telecom
Abuse contact
abuse@sarkor.uz
Registered
2002-10-21
Last changed
2026-02-24
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 30 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
49 authorising AS12365
ASPA
1 declared providers
IRR
100% registered · 30 of 30 announcements
Route objects
112 naming AS12365

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check