Autonomous system
AS11816 SERVICIO DI TELECOMUNICACION DI ARUBA SETAR N.V.
Residential APNIC
Summary
SETAR N.V. (Servicio di Telecomunicacion di Aruba)
isp mobile legacy
AS11816 is SETAR N.V. — Servicio di Telecomunicacion di Aruba — the incumbent, wholly government-owned telecom operator of Aruba, based in Oranjestad. It is the island's full- service carrier: fixed and mobile telephony, broadband and cable TV.
What it's used for
- Retail internet access for Aruban households and businesses. The reverse DNS is decisive: virtually every sampled address across the
201.229,181.41and186.189ranges resolves undersetardsl.aw.dslnames the access technology, not a customer type, but a per-address subscriber naming scheme applied uniformly across the whole estate is an eyeball network, and it matches what a national incumbent does for a living. - RIS sees 120 IPv4 prefixes / 68,352 addresses, 1 IPv6 prefix (
2800:ad0::/32), and only 3 observed neighbours. Very few peers for that much space is normal for an island incumbent: it buys transit from a small number of mainland carriers rather than peering widely.
Notable
- The v4 space is LACNIC-registered to SETAR itself and heavily deaggregated into /23s and /24s out of a handful of parent ranges — 120 prefixes covering under 70k addresses.
- One prefix stands out:
186.159.100.0/24is registered to Telefonia Bonairiano N.V. (Telbo, the incumbent operator of Bonaire), and its rDNS resolves undercust.telbo.net. A third-party registrant would normally be worth suspicion, but this is a neighbouring Caribbean incumbent's own customer space reached through SETAR — an operator relationship between two real, findable national carriers, not brokered address space.
Interesting
- Aruba's national network reaches the rest of the world through only three observed neighbours; submarine-cable geography, not network policy, is what caps that number.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| AMS-IX Amsterdam | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 80.249.211.35 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 45 prefixes · 69.38K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| AW | Aruba | 46 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS11816- Registry name
- 11816
- Registrant
- SERVICIO DI TELECOMUNICACION DI ARUBA (SETAR) N.V.
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@setarnet.aw
- Registered
- 1998-12-31
- Last changed
- 2005-12-08
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- SetarNet
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Open
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 98% valid · 121 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 131 authorising AS11816
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 98% registered · 121 of 123 announcements
- Route objects
- 131 naming AS11816
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere