Autonomous system
AS11663 SUG-1 - State of Utah
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
State of Utah
government legacy
SUG-1 is an autonomous system of the State of Utah — the state government's own network, carrying the address space its agencies use. Every prefix RIS sees is registered in ARIN to the State of Utah, under the STATE-B, UTAH-GOV and UTAH-GOV-2 handles.
What it's used for
State-government connectivity, aggregated centrally. The AS announces nine v4 prefixes covering roughly 393,000 addresses, and the bulk of that is five class-B blocks: 161.119.0.0/16, 165.239.0.0/16 and 168.177.0.0/16 through 168.180.0.0/16. RIS observes only two neighbours. That pairing — a very large address holding behind a very small number of upstreams — is the classic shape of a single large institution buying transit, not of a service provider. A carrier moving this much space would peer with hundreds of ASes; a state consolidating its agencies behind a shared upstream pair peers with two.
Notable
The registrant column is the whole argument here. Three different ARIN network handles appear, which on a commercial network could hint at leased or brokered space, but all three resolve to the same organisation: the State of Utah. Different handles for different historical allocations to the same government is ordinary registry housekeeping, not third-party involvement.
Interesting
The couple of more-specific /21 and /24 announcements carved out of 168.179.0.0/16 are the only deaggregation in the set — most likely a specific site or service steered onto a particular upstream, while the rest of the state's space rides the covering blocks.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-06, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 21 prefixes · 393K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| US | United States of America | 21 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS11663- Registry name
- SUG-1
- Registrant
- State of Utah
- Abuse contact
- ipadmin@utah.gov
- Registered
- 2010-04-16
- Last changed
- 2020-09-08
- Allocation
- assigned
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 9 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 9 authorising AS11663
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 9 of 9 announcements
- Route objects
- 17 naming AS11663
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 454 networks and 1,854 prefixes, as published 2026-11-06. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere