Autonomous system
AS11644 Nucleo de Inf. e Coord. do Ponto BR - NIC.
Unclassified
Summary
NIC.br (Núcleo de Informação e Coordenação do Ponto BR)
research enterprise legacy
AS11644 belongs to NIC.br, the Brazilian non-profit that carries out the decisions of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br): it runs the .br domain registry (Registro.br), the national CSIRT (CERT.br), the IX.br exchange-point fabric, and Brazil's internet measurement and statistics work. RIS sees 2 IPv4 prefixes (512 addresses), 2 IPv6 prefixes out of 2001:12f8::/32, and 39 observed BGP neighbours.
What it's used for
NIC.br's own service infrastructure, not customer connectivity. The two IPv4 /24s sit in 200.219.154.0 and 200.219.155.0; a direct check against the Brazilian registry confirms 200.219.154.0/24 is registered to Núcleo de Inf. e Coord. do Ponto BR itself, so the space is self-held rather than announced on behalf of anyone else.
The number that carries the meaning here is 39 neighbours against only 512 addresses. That ratio is not an eyeball network and not an enterprise: it is the shape of an organisation that peers widely and deliberately. NIC.br operates and sits inside IX.br, by participant count one of the largest exchange-point systems in the world, and the services behind these prefixes — registry, DNS, security response, measurement — are the sort that every Brazilian network wants to reach directly rather than over transit. Dozens of adjacencies against a tiny address footprint is what "peer with everybody, sell to nobody" looks like in BGP.
Notable
The IPv6 announcements are two /48s carved from 2001:12f8::/32, NIC.br's own allocation — a fitting posture for the body that has spent years pushing IPv6 adoption across Brazil.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| BR | Brazil | 2 |
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere