Autonomous system
AS11280 SNAPPYDSL-ASN1
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Snappy Internet & Telecom (SnappyDSL.NET)
isp enterprise legacy
SNAPPYDSL-ASN1 is the network of Snappy Internet & Telecom, a Miami, Florida access provider that trades as SnappyDSL.NET. RIS sees a small, stable access network: 9 IPv4 prefixes, 12,032 addresses, no IPv6, and 28 observed neighbours.
What it's used for
Broadband access and connectivity for Snappy's customers. The company's own site describes it as a business-focused operator selling internet and data connectivity, digital phone, hosting, cloud surveillance and network management, with points of presence in several US data centres and a stated founding year of 1992. The routing backs the access-network reading rather than the hosting one: the sampled reverse DNS returns names like dsl-16-5.bbsector.net and 0-5.cofs.net, which are subscriber-style access pools rather than server hostnames. Both of those domains are Miami connectivity/IT-consulting brands in the same orbit as Snappy, so this is first-party rDNS, not an upstream's default. Note that dsl names the access technology, not the customer type, so they do not by themselves prove residential subscribers.
Notable
The prefix registrants are worth reading carefully, because at a glance they look scattered. Two blocks (68.142.0.0/19, 198.177.28.0/22) are registered to SNAPPYDSL.NET itself. Two more sit under Cogent Communications, which is ordinary provider-assigned space and not a third party. The remaining four are registered to Northeast GA Internet Access on old Sprint-era netnames (SPRINT-CF2BC8-2, SPRINT-CE3D01, and similar) — a single, coherent, findable ISP registrant, not a set of unrelated shells.
Interesting
That combination — one RIR, one non-holder registrant that is itself an ISP, and real first-party reverse DNS — is the opposite of the IP-leasing silhouette (many unrelated registrants across several RIRs with no rDNS). The likeliest explanation is an acquisition or a long-standing transit arrangement whose ARIN records were never refreshed. A 28-neighbour count is likewise far too low for a wholesale carrier and about right for a regional access ISP with a handful of peers and upstreams.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| FL-IX - The Florida Internet Exchange / Community IX - Florida | Miami, United States | 206.41.108.14 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 7 prefixes · 11.01K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| US | United States of America | 7 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS11280- Registry name
- SNAPPYDSL-ASN1
- Registrant
- SNAPPYDSL.NET
- Abuse contact
- faisal@snappytelecom.net
- Registered
- 2008-07-01
- Last changed
- 2012-03-02
- Allocation
- assigned
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 7 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS11280
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 7 of 7 announcements
- Route objects
- 40 naming AS11280
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere