Autonomous system
AS11178 RS-ACCESSPL
Unclassified ARIN NSP
Summary
AccessPlus (RingSquared)
isp enterprise legacy
RS-ACCESSPLUS is the AS of AccessPlus, a regional fibre and fixed-wireless business ISP in western Massachusetts and eastern New York (Pittsfield, Springfield, Troy and the towns around them). The RS- prefix and the ARIN NOC contact both point at RingSquared, the Mahwah, New Jersey voice-and-data provider that acquired AccessPlus in 2023 and kept the brand.
What it's used for
Delivering connectivity to business and institutional customers, and routing their space for them. RIS sees 16 IPv4 prefixes / 4,864 addresses, 5 IPv6 prefixes (out of 2607:7240::/32), and 8 observed neighbours. Eight neighbours is the profile of a regional provider with a couple of transit suppliers and some peering, well short of a wholesale carrier, and the address count is right for a few thousand served endpoints rather than a mass-market eyeball network.
Notable
The registrant list looks scattered until you read it: several blocks are LVLT-ACCES-334-*, which is Level 3 space reassigned to AccessPlus' own ARIN org handle, and RSQ-NET-IPV4-2003 is RingSquared's. The remainder are customer-registered blocks, and the reverse DNS shows what those are — virt133.wne.edu (Western New England University, in Springfield, squarely inside the AccessPlus footprint) and cisco2542.activehost.com. Customers with their own address space, originated by their provider, is the honest explanation of an untidy registrant list here, not brokered address leasing.
Interesting
The rDNS is also the cleanest geographic evidence on this AS: a customer PTR under a Springfield university's domain matches the operator's published service area exactly.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Boston Internet Exchange | Boston, United States | 206.108.236.65 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-12, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 16 prefixes · 5.12K addresses IPv6 16 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| US | United States of America | 32 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS11178- Registry name
- RS-ACCESSPLUS
- Registrant
- AccessPlus
- Abuse contact
- ip-admin@ringsquared.com
- Registered
- 2011-01-18
- Last changed
- 2025-04-14
- Allocation
- assigned
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- AccessPlus Communications
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Regional
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Inbound
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
AS11178:AS-CONE- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Facilities
- 3 facilities
- Website
- http://www.accesspluscom.com
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 14% valid · 3 valid, 18 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 7 authorising AS11178
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 29% registered · 6 of 21 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 13 naming AS11178
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,769 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere