asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS10778 MCL Internet

Residential

IPv4 addresses 29.18K 55 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CL
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

MCL Internet (Netglobalis)

Chile · AI-generated

isp hosting legacy

MCL Internet is the LACNIC registration behind Netglobalis, a Santiago-based Chilean provider of corporate connectivity, colocation and managed network services. RIPE RIS sees 14 IPv4 prefixes carrying 34,048 addresses, no IPv6, and 17 observed BGP neighbours.

What it's used for

The address space is classic Chilean LACNIC allocation: four /19s in 200.2.192.0, 200.2.224.0, 200.29.0.0 and 200.29.64.0, a 168.196.184.0/22, and a scatter of more-specific /24s deaggregated out of them. Reverse DNS is the most informative part of the pack, and it points squarely at a business-access and hosting network rather than a mass-market eyeball ISP: names like fw-magnus1.netglobalis.cl (a named customer's firewall), bwm2.stgo.netglobalis.net (a bandwidth manager in Santiago), pandora-networking.netglobalis.net and pub-ip-200-29-80-5.stgo.psinet.cl read as per-customer edge devices and assigned public IPs. The whois contact address for the AS is netadmin@netglobalis.net, which is what ties the MCL handle to the Netglobalis brand.

Notable

17 neighbours against ~34k addresses is the profile of a regional ISP with a handful of upstreams and a modest customer base, not a wholesale carrier. One sampled PTR, ip-200-2-224-5.lima.netglobalis.net, uses Lima naming, suggesting the operator also lights up space outside Chile.

Interesting

The dial-5.anselnet.cl PTR is a survivor of an older era of Chilean access naming. It names a mechanism, not a customer type, and shouldn't be read as evidence of what the block carries today.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Address space

Summary

Full explorer
CountryNamePrefixes
CLChile55

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check