Routing security

AS1044 BLINN-AS

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 10 announcements

RPKI invalid 0 none

No ROA 10 not covered by any ROA

IRR registered 0% 0 missing · 10 other origin

ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

10 observed

Every prefix observed with AS1044 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

Prefix	RPKI	IRR	Vantage points
50.21.240.0/23	No ROA	IRR other origin	50
50.21.242.0/23	No ROA	IRR other origin	50
50.21.244.0/23	No ROA	IRR other origin	50
50.21.246.0/23	No ROA	IRR other origin	50
50.21.248.0/23	No ROA	IRR other origin	50
50.21.250.0/23	No ROA	IRR other origin	50
50.21.252.0/23	No ROA	IRR other origin	50
50.21.254.0/23	No ROA	IRR other origin	50
64.92.176.0/21	No ROA	IRR other origin	51
64.92.184.0/21	No ROA	IRR other origin	51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS1044 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS1044 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS1044 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-set	Where	Relationship
`AS16905:AS-CONE`	RADB	Lists AS1044 as a direct member
`AS22645:AS-CONE`	RADB	Lists AS1044 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-22 12:01 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-22. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.