Autonomous system
AS10255 SINISTER
Unclassified ARIN Cable/DSL/ISP
Summary
Sinister and Solitary (Cambridge Bandwidth Consortium)
SINISTER — registered as Sinister and Solitary — is the ASN of the Cambridge Bandwidth Consortium, a small non-profit network run by Boston-area networking professionals for their own use. It is a member co-operative, not a commercial provider.
What it's used for
Giving members provider-independent connectivity and addresses. The CBC registers itself as a 501(c)(12) corporation — the "non-profit rural telco" category — and delivers most member connectivity over GRE and 6in4 tunnels rather than physical last-mile plant, which is how a handful of engineers can hold real address space without owning any access network. It is present at MASS-IX in Boston with an open peering policy and self-reports traffic in the 0–20 Mbps band: hobby scale, deliberately.
The AS announces 7 IPv4 prefixes totalling 2,560 addresses and 2 IPv6 prefixes, including 2620:131:f000::/40. Sampled reverse DNS is the tell: FLY-BY-NIGHT.IHTFP.ORG, yay.tim.org, ether.elbows.org — members' personal domains and personal machines, not a customer base. IHTFP is MIT hacker slang, which places the culture as precisely as the routing does.
Notable
Classified other, deliberately. The space is neither eyeball broadband nor commercial hosting: it is individual members' home networks and personal servers, reached over tunnels, under one shared ASN. Two observed BGP neighbours rules out any transit role. Geolocation to eastern Massachusetts is reasonable, but do not infer an organisation behind any given address — each one is somebody's own box.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Massachusetts Internet Exchange | Boston, United States | 206.53.143.25 |
Transit providers
1 upstream, 1 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS2734 | CoreSite | 522 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 7 prefixes · 2.56K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| US | United States of America | 9 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS10255- Registry name
- SINISTER
- Registrant
- Sinister and Solitary
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@sinister.com
- Registered
- 1997-05-23
- Last changed
- 1997-05-23
- Allocation
- assigned
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Cambridge Bandwidth Consortium
- Also known as
- CBC
- Network type
- Cable/DSL/ISP
- Scope
- Regional
- Traffic ratio
- Balanced
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
AS-CAMBANDCONS- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Website
- http://www.cambridge.bandwidth-consortium.us/
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 22% valid · 2 valid, 7 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 2 authorising AS10255
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 9 of 9 announcements
- Route objects
- 16 naming AS10255
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 446 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere