asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS10193 BUSANBANK-AS-KR BUSANBANK

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 512 2 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Busan Bank (BNK Financial Group)

South Korea · AI-generated

enterprise finance korea

BUSANBANK-AS-KR is the enterprise autonomous system of Busan Bank, the regional commercial bank serving Busan and South Gyeongsang province and the founding subsidiary of BNK Financial Group.

What it's used for

  • Reaching the bank's own public-facing services: internet and mobile banking front ends, the card and payment gateways that acquirers and merchants talk to, corporate mail, and the encrypted links between branches, the data centre and interbank clearing networks.

Notable

The evidence points squarely at enterprise, not provider. RIS sees 2 announced IPv4 prefixes, 512 addresses in total, no IPv6, and 2 observed neighbours. Two upstreams and half a /23 of space is a dual-homed corporate edge: the bank runs its own ASN so its public addresses survive changing carriers, and buys transit from two of them so no single ISP failure closes online banking. A network that resold connectivity would show a peer count in the hundreds; there is nothing wholesale about two.

The two prefixes come from different parents (203.239.60.0/24 and 119.195.116.0/24) — an older KRNIC-era assignment alongside a newer one — which is the normal accretion pattern for a long-lived Korean institution rather than any sign of address trading. Both are announced by the bank itself.

Interesting

Busan Bank's ASN was registered in the same run as several other Korean financial institutions; Kiwoom Securities sits two numbers earlier at AS10192 and Kookmin Bank at AS10196. The address footprint is small because retail banking traffic terminates on a handful of load balancers, not on customer-facing address pools.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4766Korea Telecom106
AS9848SEJONG NETWORKS20

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-30, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 2 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of2

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS10193
Registry name
BUSANBANK-AS-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
2000-09-01
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS10193
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
2 naming AS10193

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 447 networks and 1,849 prefixes, as published 2026-10-30. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check