Autonomous system
AS10164 SKB-GSD-AS-KR SK Broadband Co Ltd
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
SK Broadband
residential isp south-korea
SKB-GSD-AS-KR is a secondary autonomous system of SK Broadband, the Seoul-headquartered fixed-line operator that is a wholly owned subsidiary of SK Telecom and one of South Korea's largest broadband providers. Its main network is AS9318; this number carries a divisional slice of the same estate.
What it's used for
- Holding and announcing a block of SK Broadband access space. The size and shape of the prefixes point at subscriber-facing use rather than servers.
Notable
The pack shows an unusual combination: 69,632 announced IPv4 addresses across only 10 prefixes — a very high address-to-prefix ratio, built from /18 and /19 aggregates such as 27.117.128.0/18, 110.35.96.0/19 and 180.150.192.0/19 — but just one observed BGP neighbour and no IPv6.
Read those together and the role is clear. Large contiguous aggregates announced with a single adjacency is what an operator's internal AS looks like: it exists as an addressing and policy container behind the parent network, and the outside world only ever reaches it through SK Broadband proper. It is not a carrier (one neighbour), not an enterprise (no enterprise holds 69k addresses in /18s), and not a hosting network (hosting space is carved fine, not aggregated coarse).
Confidence is held low on the use rather than the operator. SK Broadband is unambiguously an eyeball ISP and these are eyeball-shaped aggregates, but the pack returned no reverse DNS on the addresses sampled, so nothing here independently proves subscriber assignment over corporate access lines.
Interesting
- The mix includes recent APNIC blocks (
45.112.88.0/22,103.51.168.0/22) alongside older space, showing the AS still absorbs new allocations.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS9318 | SK Broadband Co Ltd | 610 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 10 prefixes · 69.63K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 10 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10164- Registry name
- SKB-GSD-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-09-01
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 10 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS10164
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 10 of 10 announcements
- Route objects
- 231 naming AS10164
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere