Autonomous system
AS10049 SKNET-AS SK Co.
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
SK Inc. (SK C&C)
enterprise it-services chaebol business korea
SKNET-AS-KR is registered to SK Co., Ltd. — SK Inc., the holding company at the top of Korea's SK Group, whose C&C business division is the group's IT arm. SK Inc. C&C does systems integration, IT outsourcing and data-centre operation, historically for SK Group affiliates and increasingly for external enterprise and cloud customers.
What it's used for
- The SK Group corporate network and the systems SK C&C runs on its affiliates' behalf: managed enterprise applications, outsourced back-office and ERP estates, and the data centres those workloads sit in.
Notable
- The evidence points to a large enterprise / IT-outsourcing network rather than a carrier, and the two figures have to be read together. RIS observes 28 IPv4 prefixes carrying 131,072 addresses — a substantial estate — but only 6 observed neighbours.
- Six adjacencies against 131k addresses is decisive. A wholesale transit provider holding that much space would peer with hundreds of ASes; six is what a large end customer buys for redundancy. So this space is consumed by SK's own and its clients' systems, not resold.
- The footprint is anchored by a legacy
168.154.0.0/16— a class-B-era block, the kind only an early corporate registrant holds — plus a set of /19s and /20s from Korean ranges (49.50.32.0/19,211.45.32.0/19,203.235.224.0/19,203.242.64.0/21). Large aggregates rather than scattered /24s is the shape of a real operator's allocation history.
Interesting
- Beware the name. "SK" spans dozens of legally distinct companies; this AS is the holding company's IT network, not SK Telecom's or SK Broadband's consumer networks, which are separate ASNs entirely.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Korea Internet Neutral Exchange KINX | Seoul, South Korea | 139.150.100.34 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 44 prefixes · 127K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 44 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS10049- Registry name
- SKNET-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2000-06-16
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 25 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 4 authorising AS10049
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 25 of 25 announcements
- Route objects
- 48 naming AS10049
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 440 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere